FlosForge Guard for macOS — privacy policy

FlosForge Guard has no account to create, no telemetry, no analytics and no server of ours. Nothing is ever sent to us, because there is nowhere for it to go. Your inventory, findings and notes stay on this Mac, in a database you own, and the App Store privacy manifest declares no data collection and no tracking.

What FlosForge Guard collects about you

Nothing. There is no account, no telemetry, no analytics, no crash reporting and no identifier of any kind. The app has no server of its own to send anything to, and it does not phone home to check for updates — the Mac App Store delivers those.

What it stores, and where

Your inventory, findings, notes, tasks and chat threads: In a local database on this Mac. Nothing is uploaded or synced anywhere; the only copies that exist are the ones you make yourself with Back Up or Export.
The vulnerability catalogue: Downloaded from the publishers you enabled and kept as a SQLite index in Application Support, so matching runs offline against your own copy.
API keys, git tokens, SFTP passwords and the app-lock PIN: In the macOS keychain — never in the database, never in an export or a backup. The PIN itself is not stored, only a salted verifier. A private key for SFTP is referenced where it already lives and never copied.
Detailed logs: Off by default, because they would write a client inventory to a plain-text file. If you switch them on you choose the retention, from seven days to a year, and prompt and reply text is a separate opt-in.

Everything it can connect to

Each of these is a connection you cause — by adding something, enabling something, or pressing a button — and none of them is made on a schedule you did not set.

The websites, repositories and servers you added: When you analyse them. Requests are paced with randomised delays, one host at a time, and the app identifies itself honestly in its User-Agent.
The vulnerability publishers you enabled: NVD, OSV.dev, the GitHub Advisory Database, EUVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, Exploit-DB, endoflife.date and the Nuclei template index, to download and refresh the catalogue. Once a catalogue exists, launch makes one small request per enabled source asking whether it holds anything newer.
Package registries, endoflife.date and wordpress.org: Asked only which version of a package is current, whether a runtime is still supported, or whether a plugin has a newer release. A generic product name or a plugin slug is all that is sent.
A public DNS-over-HTTPS resolver and Team Cymru: For DNS records and network ownership, only if you enable those checks.
News feeds: Once you open the News screen, and not before.
PageSpeed or GTmetrix: Only when you press the button that asks for an external speed measurement.
An AI provider: Only if you configured one, and only with the text shown to you first. Apple Intelligence and Ollama run on the Mac and transmit nothing.

What never leaves your Mac

No package list, no versions and no resulting CVE identifiers leave the Mac: matching runs against the catalogue on your own disk.
Nothing about your inventory as a whole is ever transmitted to anyone.
No request is made to any FlosForge server, because there is none.
No AI call is made unattended unless you switched unattended runs on, and no hosted provider is used without your own key.
The secret scanner never stores what it finds. A committed credential is reported by file, line and kind only.

AI

AI is optional and off by default. Vulnerability matching is deterministic and never involves a model.
Apple Intelligence and Ollama run on this Mac and send nothing anywhere. Google Gemini runs on Google’s servers under your own API key and billing.
On-device and hosted providers each need a separate, explicitly worded acknowledgement, because they are two different bargains.
Every prompt the app builds tells the model not to invent versions or CVE identifiers, and a proposal it makes enters the inventory only when you accept it.

Safeguards

Sandboxed, with the hardened runtime: The app never listens on a port. It carries the network-client entitlement for everything it asks for, and a network-server entitlement solely so the Network tab can receive an ICMP echo reply for ping.
Read-only by construction: The SFTP layer has no write, delete, rename or permission operation in it at all, and scanning never edits your code, changes a setting or installs anything.
Active checks need your word: Exposure probing requires a per-asset ownership attestation, enforced in the network layer rather than only in the interface.
App lock: Touch ID, Apple Watch or a PIN, with auto-lock after a time you choose. Window contents are hidden when the app is not frontmost, so a client’s vulnerability list does not appear in a screen share.

Your rights, and who to ask

Because the app holds nothing about you, there is nothing for the controller to access, correct or erase on your behalf: everything it knows is in files on your own Mac, under your own control. Removing the app and its container removes all of it — the database, the catalogue index and the logs. The keychain items go with it. For anything else, write to hello@flosforge.eu. The site-wide privacy policy covers this website, your rights under the GDPR, and the supervisory authority you can complain to.

Changes

This statement is checked against each release. If a version changes what the app stores or what it can connect to, the version and date at the top change with it.